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Program Regulation and the Freedom of Expression: Red Lion's
Alive and Well in Canada?
by PaulSlansky*
I. INTRODUCTION

The recent trends towards deregulation in the United States often have

had impact in Canada because of the economic relation between the
countries and similarities in the two legal systems. The impact is particularly strong when the deregulation has transborder implications or when
it relates to the constitutional civil liberties which Canada has entrenched
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of its Constitution.
This paper is an evaluation of American broadcasting regulation and deregulation from a Canadian perspective in order to justify Canadian program regulation, in particular Canadian content regulation.
Many in the United States have great difficulty understanding the
Canadian justification for Canadian content regulation and have seen it
as a form of economic protectionism for the Canadian entertainment industry.' However, it is more importantly a form of program regulation.
American law can be used to show that Canada must regulate programming and Canadian content. If Canadian content regulation can be solidly justified in American law, then the United States will have no legal
basis to complain or pressure Canada over such regulation.
In determining whether program deregulation would be legally and
constitutionally possible under either Canadian or American law, one
should analyze the law both in preregulation and in post regulation settings, determine how the Canadian legal system fits (if at all) within the
American system, and apply the American law when it fits into the Canadian system. Such a comparative exercise is also useful in understanding the possible directions of the Canadian courts with respect to both
Charter and broadcasting law. As Charter cases develop in Canada, the
American cases can be looked to for comparison if not guidance. The
Canadian courts will likely look to the quality of the U.S. cases as well as
their applicability in the Canadian context. Therefore, an examination of
American cases to determine their quality will provide a context for their
application to Canadian law.
Both of these factors, quality and applicability, point to the accept* BA., McMaster University; LL.B, University of Windsor, Faculty of Law; J.D., University
of Detroit School of Law. The author is an articling student in Toronto. The initial assistance of

Professor Mary Gerace, University of Windsor, Communications is hereby acknowledged.

I Indeed it does have this effect. Whether this is its purpose is outside the scope of this paper.
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ance in Canada of Red Lion BroadcastingInc. v. Federal Communications Commission2 and to Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. Federal
Communications Commission.3 Acceptance is likely despite the erosion
of the reasoning in these cases in the United States, especially notable
and relevant in Federal Communications Commission v. WNCN Listener's Guild,4 in which the Federal Communications Commission's
(FCC) Programming Statement on Deregulation 5 was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Statutory authorities will be dealt with separately from the constitutional questions because the former are subject to change by Congress
and Parliament, while the latter are not. Obviously, the latter are more
important as a justification for Canadian content regulation and thus will
be of primary concern, but statutory authority is also relevant for predictions and for general understanding of the two systems. However, while
considering these as two distinct parts, keep in mind that both of the
statutory schemes are intertwined with the freedom of expression.6

II. AMERuCAN PROGRAM REGULATION
A.

Statutory ProgramRegulation: The Public Interest

If the FCC has the authority to regulate programming,7 but has recently decided not to do so,' surely the U.S. government and entertainment industry cannot complain that the Canadian Radio-Television
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) does not or should not have
such authority (especially since the FCC exercised that authority until
1981 in entertainment programming and still does in nonentertainment
programming).9 Indeed, there is little dispute that either the FCC or the
CRTC has the authority to regulate programming. What is of issue in
the United States is: 1) whether the FCC regulations serve the public
interest (i.e., is deregulation possible without a legislative amendment),
and 2) whether procedural safeguards must be provided under the
Broadcasting Act (the Act).10 These have been issues of dispute in the
United States since deregulation was initiated and executed by the issuance of a policy statement and not by legislative amendment. In Canada,
this is particularly important because of the express authorization of program regulation in section 3(d) of the Act (the policy section of the
Act).1 ' An examination of regulatory authority is needed to understand
2 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
3 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
4

450 U.S. 582 (1981).

Deregulation of Radio, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976).
6 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
7 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
8 Deregulation of Radio, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976).
9 Id
10 Broadcasting Act, 1967-68, CAN. REV. STAT. B-11 § 3(c).
I Id. § 3(d).
5
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these two important issues.
In Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission it
was decided that although the programming format in question has only
small general appeal "each member of the public is entitled to service
from each station in the community."' 12 A punishment for failure to
comply with Great Lakes, loss of license renewal, was upheld in KFKB
BroadcastingAssociation v. FederalRadio Commission as constitutional
and not abridging the first amendment. 13 The basis of the decision was
public interest. This was eventually codified in the 1934 Communications Act, requiring the regulation for the public "convenience, interest
or necessity." 14
The first Supreme Court case to support program regulation was
NationalBroadcasting Co. (NBC) v. United States. The Supreme Court
defined public interest in terms of the needs of the "listening public."' 5
The Court also said that the FCC has the "burden" of determining the
composition of radio communication."6 Although the Supreme Court
has now abandoned this aspect of the case 7 and no lower courts have
ruled to the contrary, 8 support still exists for the principle first enunciated in NBC that the FCC "cannot" discharge its licensing responsibility
"merely by finding that there are no technological objections"; 19 that is,
there must be an actual evaluation of the public interest.2 0 This would
seem to require a determination
of what was in the public interest, at
2
least in some situations. '
In 1946, the FCC put out their Blue Book, a codification of procedural factors to use in determining what programming is in the public
interest.2 2 The importance of determining what was in the public interest
was reemphasized in Federal Communications Commission v. R.C.A.
Communications.23 In RCA the Supreme Court said that consideration
of competition and market forces alone was not sufficient in determining
what was in the public interest.2 4 A regulatory body can only allow competition if "satisfactory accommodation of the peculiarities of individual
industries to the demands of public interest" are made.2 5
37 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
KFKB Broadcasting Assoc. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(a), (b), (f) (1982).
15 National BroadcastingCo., 319 U.S. at 216.
16 Id
17 WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. at 582.
18 WNCN Listener's Guild v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 610 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
19 NationalBroadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 216.
12
13
14

20

Id

Id at 217.
7 W. FRANKLiN, MAss
23 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
24 Id at 91.
25 Id at 93.
21
22

MEDIA LAW

744 (2d ed. 1982).
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In 1960, the En Banc Programming procedure was advanced. 26 It
adopted a fourteen-factor method of determining what is in the public
interest. This was later expanded to require that surveys of the community be done (the "ascertainment" procedures).2 7 The procedure was furto allow interviews with community leaders instead of
ther amended
28
surveys.

In Red Lion Broadcastingv. Federal Communications Commission,
the Supreme Court upheld the personal attack-response aspect of the
fairness doctrine. The Court held that the FCC has authority to require
discussion of public issues for the public interest.2 9 The court went so far
as to say that the public interest supported the fairness doctrine as part of
a collective interest in having the Act "function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment."3 Therefore, in considering
what is in the public interest one must consider the "ends and purposes
of the First Amendment," including promotion of "the marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." 3 1 Thus, the Supreme Court
justified program regulation in order to directly promote the rationale of
the first amendment rather than through the usual route of freedom of
the press. This approach was new and short-lived, since the court later
decided to stress the freedom of the press over promotion of the rationale
of the first amendment directly through broadcast regulation.32
These stringent requirements for programming in determining the
public interest were continued in a series of District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals cases, starting with the Citizens Committee to Preserve
34 These cases35 used Red Lion to infuse
the Arts in Atlanta33 to WNCN.
"public interest" with the first amendment values of protecting the "marketplace of ideas,"' 36 thereby requiring diversity in programming. The
result was a doctrine that required a hearing both when more than one
channel is available and a public interest exists in having diversity of
radio formats.37 However, if satisfactory alternatives are available,38 or if
26 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).

27 Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d
650 (1971).
28 Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C. 2d 418 (1976).
29 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 382.
30 Id. at 390.
31 Ad
32 WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. at 582.
33 Citizen's Comm. to Preserve the Arts in Atlanta v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 436
F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
34 610 F.2d at 838.
35 Citizen's Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 478 F.2d 926
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Lakewood Broadcasting Service v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 478 F.2d 919
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Hartford Communications Comm. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 467 F.2d
408 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Citizen's Comm. to Save WEFM v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 506 F.2d

246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
36 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390.
37 WEFM, 506 F.2d at 249.
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no significant public outcry over format change erupts,3 9 or if no "substantial or material question of fact" exists to be determined, 4° then no
hearing would be required.
However, this whole line of cases requiring at least a safety valve in
determining public interest by hearing4 1 was overturned by the Supreme
Court in Federal Communications Commission v. WNCN Listener's
Guild.4 2 The Court said that the FCC's policy statement, which decided
that diversity is best served by market forces rather than regulation, must
be deferred to as the FCC's determination of what is in the public interest.43 It is up to the FCC to weigh public interest, whereas courts only
exercise a judicial review on a limited basis.' In this case, the Court had
to rule that the FCC's decision was not unreasonable, so the lack of a
safety valve (hearing when needed) did not make the policy statement
invalid.4 5 But, it was noted that if the FCC's prediction that market
forces best serve the public interest did not prove to be accurate, the FCC
should 46
reinstitute program regulation in order to serve the public
interest.
Although WNCN fits into the scheme of the constitutional development of the fairness doctrine, it is a clear break from the important early
cases in the area (NBC,RCA, and Red Lion) and the well accepted D.C.
Circuit cases of the past decade. All of these cases emphasized the importance and mandatory nature of the FCC's "burden" to determine
what is in the "public interest." It is well recognized that the public
interest is a flexible standard, varying from case to case.4 7 How then can
the FCC lay down a rigid rule of deregulation without provision for hearings when needed and claim that the public interest has been determined,
let alone served?
The D.C. Circuit seems willing to accept the demise of the RCA
holding that a regulatory agency has very limited authority to deregulate,
and only if hearings are made available. This fits the RCA minimum
requirement that there be "satisfactory accommodation. . to the demands of public interest. ' 4 Indeed, the market may serve diversity generally and thus the public interest but it was a recognition that the
market does not always promote sufficient diversity that prompted regu38 Id; Citizen's Comm. to Preserve the Arts in Atlanta, 436 F.2d at 263; Citizen's Comm. to
Keep Progressive Rock, 478 F.2d at 926.
39 Lakewood BroadcastingService, 478 F.2d at 919; Hartford Communications Comm, 467
F.2d at 408.
40 Lakewood BroadcastingService, 478 F.2d at 919.
41 WEFM, 506 F.2d at 249; WNCNListener's Guild, 610 F.2d at 838.

42 450 U.S. at 582.
43 Id at 593.

44Id
45 Ide
46 Id at 595.
47 This is a result of the reference of WNCN.
48 7 W. FRANK iN,supra note 22, at 744.
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lation in the first place.49 In fact, all of the D.C. cases indicate instances
in which the market has broken down. All of these cases leave format
decisions up to the licensee subject to scrutiny and hearing only if the
facts demand it.
The Supreme Court distorted this aspect of the D.C. Circuit cases
by suggesting that the D.C. Circuit rejected reliance on market forces.5"
The Supreme Court's departure from its previous precedents, NBC and
RCA in particular, and the well developed D.C. line of cases is not justified here but serves as another example of the deference of the Burger
court to government policy decisions. Canadian courts should not follow
this decision since the earlier cases are more consistent and logical and,
as we shall later discover, more consistent with the Canadian system.
B.

The FairnessDoctrine and the FirstAmendment

The constitutional aspect of programming regulation is based on:
1) limitations on the freedom of the broadcaster as an aspect of free press
which allows regulation, 1 and 2) the positive first amendment right of
the audience (viewers and listeners) to receive diverse programming
based on the "ends and purposes of the First Amendment" (marketplace
of ideas) which requiresregulation.52 Thus, regulation is constitutionally
authorized as well as constitutionally required.
Until recently, it was thought that a "multitude of tongues" theory
was not totally applicable to broadcasting because of the scarcity of frequencies, the nature of broadcasting as an advertising medium, involuntary tendencies of the medium, and the failure of the market to always
provide diverse programming.5 3 However, the Supreme Court has returned to that approach. Indeed, the Red Lion case which espouses the
positive duty to regulate5 4 has been increasingly reduced and limited, and
may not even be law anymore inthe United States. It has been interpreted in later cases as a limit on the first amendment.5 5 These later
cases have merely upheld a limited form of Red Lion while discarding its
substance and rationale: the direct attainment of the ends and means of
the first amendment-the preservation of a marketplace of ideasthrough broadcast regulation, rather than through the traditional
method of a free press and a "multitude of tongues."5 6
The limitation on broadcaster freedom was originally outlined in
NationalBroadcasting Co. v. United States5 7 in 1943, in order to allow
49
50
51
52
53

PEFM, 506 F.2d at 246.
National BroadcastingCo., 319 U.S. at 217.

54
55
56
57

Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S. at 376.
Starting with WNCNListener's Guild, 450 U.S. 603-04.
WEFM, 506 F.2d at 273-74.
National BroadcastingCo., 319 U.S. at 190.

WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. at 591-92.
Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S. at 390.
WEFM, 506 F.2d at 274.
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program regulation of broadcasting. The Supreme Court distinguished
broadcasting from newspapers on the basis of scarcity of frequencies."s
This distinction has been much misunderstood. For instance, J.A. Barron has said that scarcity is not a sufficient basis for broadcast regulation
because there are more broadcasters than newspapers. 9 Barron talks in
terms of numbers and qualitative differences in diversity (i.e., many stations are "top 40" stations).'
This is wrong, plain and simple. The authority to regulate programming does not relate to numbers but to the nature of broadcast frequencies and the extent of constitutionally authorized state action. Before the
Radio Act6" and the Radio Treaty6 2 were enacted broadcasting was technologically impossible because of the limited number of frequencies and
the unlimited number of broadcasters-there was simply too much interference. Because of the technological nature of scarce broadcast frequencies, the government had to regulate who gets a license and who does
not.
However, in denying a license to broadcast, the government is potentially abridging the applicant's first amendment right to a free press.
With newspapers, the only limit on numbers is an economic one, which
involves no state action. In contrast, the government regulation of frequency allocation makes the first amendment "kick in." While National
Broadcasting Co. recognized that "unlike other modes of expression,
[broadcasting] is subject to governmental regulation,"6 3 the Court also
recognized that this regulation limited the applicants' first amendment
rights since there is no right to broadcast without a license.' Therefore,
the Supreme Court emphasized that if licensees were chosen "upon the
basis of their political, economic, or social views or upon any other capricious basis," then denial of a license could be a breach of the first amendment.6" However, the Court said that denial of a license for "public
66
convenience, interest, or necessity . . . is not denial of free speech.
This makes the determination of issues in Section IIA of this paper crucial because, if the public interest is not properly being served by the
regulatory policies and procedures of the FCC, the first amendment is
being breached because the limits on free press do not go that far. This is
why a discussion of the public interest invites reference to the first
amendment.
58 Id.
59 D. GILMOuR & . BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW 659 (1969).

60 Id
61 Radio Act, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
62 Telecommunication: Coordination and Use of Radio Frequencies Above 30 Megacycles per
Second, Oct. 24, 1962, Canada-United States, 13 U.S.T. 2418, T.I.A.S. No. 5205.
63 NationalBroadcastingCo., 319 U.S. at 194.
64 Id
65 Id

66 Id

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9:81 1985

However, according to Red Lion, the first amendment may also be
breached directly if diversity of programming is not being promoted.
The Supreme Court here does not say that broadcasters have no rights to
free speech or free press. Rather, the Court says that there is no right to
snuff out the free speech of others and that the rights of viewers and
listeners are paramount over broadcasters' rights. 67 Assuming these two
categories of rights exist and that they sometimes conflict, why did the
Supreme Court say that the rights of the audience are paramount? It is
because of the nature of the audience rights. These rights are the rights
"'of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic,
moral and other ideas and experiences, which cannot be abridged by Congress or by the FCC."' 68 The right to a "marketplace of ideas" and "experiences" is a direct right to the "ends and purposes of the First
Amendment. ' 69 Whenever a conflict exists between or within constitutional rights the conflict should be resolved by recourse to the rationales
of the rights. When it is a conflict within a constitutional right presumably there is just one rationale and the decision should be easy: whichever
interpretation better serves the rationale should prevail. Since the freedom of the press only imperfectly serves the rationale, and considering
the right to receive is an embodiment of the rationale, the choice is obviously in favor of the right to receive.
What is the scope of this right as envisaged in Red Lion? From the
wording of the right' 0 the scope is very wide. It is not limited, as the
court has later interpreted, with respect to the type of issues involved.
The right is not just a right with respect to public issues or
"nonentertainment. '7 1 It relates to:
1)social-generally public but may be more focused;
2)political-publicby nature;
3)aesthetic-generally not public, rather includes art, music, and
other entertainment;
4)morals--can be public or private, but certainly varied;
5)or other-in context with (1) to (4) but definitely not just public or
nonentertainment.
Likewise, the right is not limited merely to "ideas," i.e., discussion of
music in the abstract, but "experiences," including actual music, religious programming, or other programs.
Thus, there is generally a constitutional right to diverse programming-programming for all people and all interests. It, like the limitation on free speech in NBC, is based on scarcity of frequencies and relates
67 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390.
68 Id (emphasis added).
69 Id at 390.

70 Id at 380.
71 WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. at 602.
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to the "public interest."'72 As Justice White says, Congress could have
instituted a public system which would have satisfied the public right to
access, but Congress did not do this; instead, it instituted a regulated
private system.7" However, private broadcasters received licenses on the
condition that the public interest would be served.74 In order to serve the
public interest, broadcasters cannot repress public or private interest in
types of ideas and experiences that the public would have had if the system had been public.7 5 The broadcaster therefore must statutorily and
constitutionally provide for the interests of all in the community. The
constitutional aspects of public interest in diversity were later adopted in
the D.C. Circuit cases.7 6
Red Lion was the high point of constitutionally required diversity in
programming. Although the doctrine has not been overruled, it has only
been applied in form, not substance. The Supreme Court has subsequently interpreted the fairness doctrine narrowly in scope and the diversity aspects as limited to statutory requirements.7 7 The Court has
interpreted the "right of viewers and listeners" as a limit on the right of
broadcasters rather than as a constitutional right on its own, which conflicts with but overrides the right of the broadcaster.7" If the "right of
viewers and listeners" is not a constitutional right but a constitutional
limit, the court or Congress can easily reduce the limit on the Constitution, whereas it cannot substantially limit the right if it were itself a constitutional right.
However, before we examine the decline of Red Lion in the Supreme
Court we must recognize that the true nature of the Red Lion doctrine
was recognized and brilliantly analyzed in WEFM7 9 by Chief Judge
Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit. In the first instance, Judge Bazelon, speaking for the three judge court, held that no hearing was required because
diversity was not "seriously threatened."8 0 He recognized problems with
regulation and deregulation,8 ' but suggested a balancing of interest by
leaving programming up to the market unless diversity was seriously
threatened, at which time a hearing would be required.82 This would
minimize the possible dangers of government censorship and control and
the possible chilling effects caused by regulation. 3 He also recognized
that Red Lion created a constitutional right to receive "the widest possid at 601.
73 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390-91.
74 Id at 391.
75 Id
76 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
78 Id
79 WEFM, 506 F.2d at 246.
80
72

Id

81

Id at 251.

82
83

Id at 252.
Id at 251.
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ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"
in order to achieve the goal of the first amendment. 4 Furthermore,
while complete reliance on the market could inhibit rather than promote
this goal, some reliance was needed to prevent undue regulation." He
decided that a hearing was not required in this case because there were
two other classical stations in the area and thus diversity was not seriously threatened.86
The majority overruled Judge Bazelon en banc, relying on Citizens
Committee to Preservethe Arts in Atlanta 7 and using a statutory analysis
which required a hearing to see if the other two stations were adequate
replacements. This approach was specifically overruled in WNCN by the
Supreme Court.88 However, Bazelon's first judgment and his second
concurring judgment remain relevant to our study, although they were
also overruled in WNCN. Judge Bazelon agreed to change the result in
order to let the FCC reconsider its first amendment values.8 9 He distinguished between the diversity and competition strains of the first amendment and recognized that the latter attempts to achieve the former
through the "multitude of tongues" approach.' This is the traditional
free press approach to the first amendment. Furthermore, he felt that
competition does not always promote the goal of diversity. 91 He explicitly rejected Justice Douglas' approach in Columbia Broadcasting System 92 which espouses a total multitude of tongues approach. He
recognized that regulations are needed to require licensees to inquire into
the needs of the community,93 and as a remedy when the market fails to
produce diversified programming-a remedy which is achieved through
the fairness doctrine and licensing procedures.94 Otherwise, his second
decision paralleled the first.
The Supreme Court decided Columbia BroadcastingSystem v. DemocraticNational Committee in the same year as WEFM.95 It is difficult to
analyze the constitutional implications of ColumbiaBroadcastingSystem
because of the many different opinions. The case basically decided that a
broadcaster cannot be forced to accept a paid advertisement according to
the Act or the fairness doctrine of Red Lion.96 Justices Powell and
Blackmun ignored the fairness doctrine because they believed the case
84

I

85 Id.
86 Id. at 250.

87 Citizen's Comm. to Preserve the Arts in Atlanta, 436 F.2d at 265.
88 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
89 WEFM, 506 F.2d at 277.
90 Id.
91 Id.

92 Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 113 (1973).

93 27 F.C.C. 650 (1971); WEFM, 506 F.2d at 277.
94 WEFM, 506 F.2d at 277-78.
95 Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 412 U.S. at 113.
96 Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S. at 382.
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could be decided based on section 153(h) of the Act alone, which provided that broadcasters are not to be treated as common carriers.97
However, the rest of the Court recognized that an evaluation of the
public interest invites reference to the first amendment. Justices Burger,
Rehnquist and Stewart all recognized that section 153(h) is a limit on the
fairness doctrine. 93 However, they still upheld the fairness doctrine generally. Justice White also recognized the validity of the fairness doctrine
but said that "broadcasters have wide discretion." 99 Justice Douglas
would have overruled Red Lion and the fairness doctrine."o Justices
Brennan and Marshall purported to follow Red Lion here. 1 ' In tallying
up the Justices, six of the Justices would uphold Red Lion, but five (Burger, Rehnquist, Stewart, White (somewhat) and Douglas (totally)) would
limit the fairness doctrine at least for common carrier-type requirements.
It is important to note that a majority of the court misunderstood
Red Lion. Burger and Rehnquist said that if licensees are restricted too
much the first amendment will not flourish. 2 They saw the first amendment in classical terms notwithstanding the changes made by Red Lion.
The said that the first amendment protects broadcasters' freedom, but
they refused to recognize the countervailing first amendment rights of the
public. 0 31 The degree of their misunderstanding is shown by Chief Justice Burger's comment that one must treat broadcasters like newspapers
and that the source of the state action is not clear to him."° This shows
a misunderstanding of NBC and the scarcity doctrine which allows
broadcasting regulation at all.
Powell and Blackmun failed to realize that the first amendment
might be in conflict with section 153(h). If the fairness doctrine was only
a limit on the first amendment right of free press then there would not be
any conflict between section 153(h) and the first amendment, so the two
Justices would not have to consider it. However, Red Lion says that the
fairness doctrine is a positive right of the viewers and listeners which
could potentially override section 153(h) in some cirucmstances. 10 5
Therefore, Justices Powell and Blackmun should have discussed the constitutional issues.
Likewise, Justice Douglas, who did not take part in Red Lion, also
misunderstood that case. He said that there was now less scarcity of
frequencies because of improved technology, so there is less reason for
97 Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 412 U.S. at 113.
98 Id. at 108, 118.
99 Id at 112.
100 Id.at 128. He said that frequencies are less scarce now; he obviously misunderstood the

NBC case.
101 Id at 182-83.
102 Id at 109.
103 Id
104 Id
105 Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S. at 382.
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Red Lion.1" 6 In fact, the number of frequencies is irrelevant to scarcity
as a basis for the holding in Red Lion. Scarcity of frequencies is relevant
because the government cannot let everyone broadcast, unlike newspapers where anyone can print if he or she can afford to. In considering
who can broadcast (as in NBC) the government must also dictate how, in
order that those unable to broadcast may still have access to their interests and tastes (as in Red Lion). If government does not regulate in this
way they are denying the first amendment rights of those people who are
unrepresented. Therefore, Justice Douglas mistakenly placed importance on numbers, when actually it is the inability to license everyone
which is crucial, regardless of the actual availability of frequencies. This
is the beginning of the trend to treat Red Lion as a limitation on the
freedom of the press and not as a positive first amendment right.1 "7
This trend is continued in Federal Communications Commission v.
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,0 8 where Red Lion is only
narrowly followed on its constitutional grounds by reference to the NBC
limitations of the first amendment. Use of Red Lion's positive first
amendment right doctrine would have been helpful in this case. However, the Supreme Court refused to use it and instead relied on Red
interest aspects, not its examination of constitutional
Lion's public
10 9
principles.
The culmination of this trend was in WNCN" 0 in 1981. Here Justice White seems to have recanted or forgotten his own reasoning in Red
Lion because he limited the doctrine to "controversial issues of importance and concern to the the public," which did not include listeners'
"favorite entertainment programs.""' This is a far cry from "the right
of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic,moral
and other ideas and experiences which may not be abridged by Congress
or the FCC.""' 2 Access to aesthetic experiences would seem specifically
to cover one's "favorite entertainment programs." The dictionary defini13
tion of "aesthetic" is "belonging to the appreciation of the beautiful."
Even if this does not cover music surely "other" does. Although the
dissent goes off on procedural safeguard grounds, for the most part they
do criticize the treatment of Red Lion by the majority. The dissent cites
RCA as a limit on the power of a regulatory agency to deregulate and
Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson"' for the proposition that the distinction be106 Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 412 U.S. at 128.

107 Id. at 109, 127, 135.
108 Federal Communications Commission v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
109 Id

110 450 U.S. at 595.

111 Id
112 Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added).
113 THm OXFORD ENGLISH DicTIONARY 147 (1937).
114 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952).
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tween entertainment
and information is not important for first amend115
ment purposes.
Which of these interpretations is consistent with the true intent of
the first amendment? Considering the nature of listener's rights in Red
Lion as embodying the rationale of the first amendment without denying
the freedom of the broadcaster (as Justices Stewart and White both recognized in CBS), 1 " it would seem that Red Lion best represents the interests of the first amendment. It strives to achieve the balance that
Judge Bazelon
said was required in his concurring judgment in
WEFM.117 That judgment in fact is the most accurate reflection of first
amendment values, but is only a concurring judgment in a D.C. Circuit
case, compared to Red Lion which is a unanimous decision of the
Supreme Court. However, Judge Bazelon makes a good point that too
much regulation may not serve the first amendment1 1 because government does not always know best and government could abuse the process. An approach like Judge Bazelon's in implementing Red Lion seems
the best route to serve the rationale of the first amendment, because it
leaves the broadcaster a fair bit of leeway in programming except where
regulation would better promote diversity interests in the first
amendment.
CBS and WNCN suggest that broadcaster freedom is the essence of
the first amendment and that Red Lion is a limit thereon. If that were
true what would be the basis of this limit, practicalities? This is not a
sufficient reason to restrict the first amendment and is surely not a compelling state interest. Is it in the public interest? This is indeed seen as a
limit on freedom of the broadcast press in NBC." 9 But is freedom of the
press the only strain of the first amendment, or does free speech encompass public rights to receive as Red Lion and WEFM recognize? The
fairness doctrine can be seen as a limit only if the first amendment is
limited to free press. However, Red Lion has not been overruled. Justice
White, who authored Red Lion, also wrote the opinion in WNCN. He
recognized that the listener does have first amendment rights and that
the fairness doctrine enhances rather than limits the first amendment.
However, in the next sentence he limited the doctrine in line with the
recent trend. It is true that the marketplace may serve diversity to an
extent, but the FCC has a constitutional and statutory obligation to determine how it is best served in any particular instance. It is clear that
Red Lion is a good interpretation of the first amendment in broadcasting.
Later cases have misinterpreted and unduly limited it. There is no reason why Canada should apply the later interpretations over Red Lion.
115 450 U.S. at 615-16.
116 Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 412 U.S. at 128.
117 506 F.2d at 252.

118 Id.at 251.
119 319 U.s. at 217.
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CANADIAN PROGRAM REGULATION

CanadianPolicy and ProgrammingLaw

In the Canadian context, program regulation has long been the rule.
Ordinary program regulation has been far more developed than in the
United States, but less development has occurred in the equivalent Canadian fairness doctrine. In Canada content regulation is a unique aspect
of program regulation. Such regulation requires a certain percentage of
broadcast time to be Canadian in origin.12 This form of regulation apas television. Though it is not as crucial nor as
plies to radio as well
2
stringent in radio.' '
This regulation is important because Canadians have underdeveloped concepts of nationalism and cultural identity. There are many divi22
sions within Canada, including: a more distinct social class structure;
1 23
and biculmore developed regional disparity and regional identities;
24 These
side.
either
tural and bilingual elements with resentments on
elements contribute to the cultural identity, a problem aside from any
problems of U.S. influence. As such, Canadian culture is a "mosaic"
rather than a "melting pot" and so is not as unified or cohesive as the
United States. Therefore, Canada has more of a need to develop cultural
identity than does the United States, where a strong national identity ties
the states and the people together.
Moreover, not only does Canada have an identity crisis, but it had
forty-four percent of its population within reach of U.S. television in
1965 and more for radio. 125 This percentage has grown substantially
since 1965. This influx of American culture makes it more difficult for
Canada to form an identity of its own. Canadian children often know
more about Daniel Boone and "Honest Abe" than they do about Louis
Riel and J. A. MacDonald because of the influence of U.S. media. As
Capital Cities Communication v. CRTC 2 6 indicates, it is illegal to tamper with American programming coming into Canada. Therefore, if
Canada is to help foster a Canadian sense of identity, it must do so by
regulating the Canadian content in programming.
1. Programming Policy
The Canadian broadcast network is different in one important as120 Radio (A.M.) Broadcasting Regulations, CoNs. CAN. RaG. ch. 379, § 12 (1978); Television
Broadcasting Regulations, CoNs. CAN. RG. ch. 381, § 8 (1978).
121 Compare Television Broadcasting Regulations, supra note 120, at § 8 with Radio (A.M.)
Broadcasting Regulations, supra note 120, at § 12.
122 W. CLEMENT, THE CANADIAN CORPORATE ELrrE 172 (1975).
123 D. GLENDAY, H. GuINDoN & A. TuRowET7, MODERNIZATION AND THE CANADIAN
STATE 85-86 (1978).
124 Id. at 209-10.
125 REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE ON BROADCASTING 17 (1965).
126 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141.
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pect; it is a combination of both public and private systems. The Canadian Broadcasting Co. (CBC), the national broadcast service, is a public
system run as a branch of the government (a crown corporation) and
thus should be more fully devoted to the goals of the Act than private
broadcasters would be. But this duality does not affect the regulation of
private broadcasters. The Broadcasting Act treats them separately, as if
there were no CBC. 12 7 Thus, the fact that the CBC exists is not an impediment to the application of U.S. law based on a privately owned
system.
The four objectives of the dual broadcast system are: (1) wide and
varied programming choice, (2) high quality programs, (3) broadcaster
responsibility, and (4) awakening Canadians to Canadian realities
through broadcasting.' 2 8 These objectives are codified in section 3 of the
Broadcasting Act.2 9 The 1965 Parliamentary Committee report rejected
programming for the majority or for the average listener or viewer. 130 It
saw the public not as a homogenous mass but as interlocking, overlapping groups."' The Committee thought that each of these minority
groups should be appealed to. The Committee also recognized that when
there are few alternatives for an audience, broadcasters must be more
varied. 132 However, this did not mean that urban centers should have
specialization. Admittedly, some specialization would be appropriate,
but this should be specialization for particular groups of the listening
public rather then specialized types of programming.' 3 3 This is to
achieve
the goal of providing stations to which the people could be faithful.134 Overall, this system is quite similar to the U.S. one except that
specialized types of programming alone were encouraged more in the
United States than in Canada in 1965.
Has that changed since 1965? In 1965 private broadcasters were
very responsive to local concerns, 135 but not very responsive to the needs
of Canadian content. 13 6 In 1978, local private broadcasters had become
even more responsive to local needs. 1 37 Likewise, the basic structure of
program regulation has not changed much recently. CRTC's 1983 Review of Radio proposes numerous changes, but most are consolidation
127 Broadcasting Act, 1967-68 CAN. REV. STAT. B-1I (compare Parts H and

m

of the Act).

128 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BROADCASTING, supranote 125, at 17; Broadcasting Act,

1967-68, CAN. REV. STAT. B-11, § 3(b), (c), (d).
129 Broadcasting Act, 1967-68, CAN. REv. STAT. B-11, § 3.
130 REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON BROADCASTING, supra note 125, at 18.
131 Id.

132 Id
133 IJd at 18-19.
134

Id at 19.

135 Id at 52.
136
137

Id
See generally, TELECOMMUNICATION

GROUP, SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY,

A STUDY

OF

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW FORMS OF LOCAL PROGRAMING WITHIN THE CANADIAN BROADcASr

SYSTEM 8 (1978).
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and updating for efficiency.13 8 The CRTC will become less stringent in
the amount of detail that it requires for license application.' 3 9 However,
the general degree of regulation compared to the United States is still
high. This is especially true of the F.M. frequency, where Canadian policy has differentiated F.M. from A.M. since regulation of the latter has
been, up to now, less than successful. 1' Canadian content has stayed the
same in radio, 4 ' while in television there has been a decision to revise it
into a weighted point scheme. However, even the television changes are
no less stringent.
Is old U.S. policy compatible with the Canadian policy? The U.S.
system relied heavily on the discretion of the broadcaster and did not
worry too much about license transfer unless there was a format change.
Canadian policy is much more stringent and keeps a closer check on its
licensees. 42 It has stringent promises of performance, even though the
1983 policy statement pared them down somewhat.'4 3 Also, before the
deregulation in the United States, the trend in the late 1970's was towards less regulation in the United States. The same cannot be said for
Canada.
But is this a difference of degree, or a difference in kind? This depends mostly on the attitude of the regulatory agency. In the United
States, the FCC felt uncomfortable with too much regulation because of
the traditions of a free press. In Canada, those traditions have not been
as strong. Generally, the CRTC is fairly comfortable in a regulatory ladden atmosphere. However, if Canada were to choose between the old
U.S. scheme and the present deregulated scheme, the former would be
far more compatible.
2.
a.

Statutory Program Regulation

Section 3

The 1968 Broadcasting Act'" is different in structure and philosophical underpinnnings than the United States Act. Unlike the American Communications Act, 4 5 which gives the FCC the power to regulate
programming, the Canadian Act is centered around section 3, which
codifies Canadian broadcasting policy. In section 15 of the Act the Commission shall "regulate. . .and supervise. . . the broadcasting policy
138 CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION & TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT
ON THE REVIEW OF RADIO: NOTICE 83-43 (1983) [hereinafter cited as RADIO POLICY
STATEMENT].
139 Ia.at 4-5, 8-9.
14o Id at 3.
'4' Id at 24.
142 For example, the CRTC regulates the amount of theatrical performance, informational programming, general music programming and, of course, Canadian content.
143 RADIO POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 138, at 4-5.
144 Broadcasting Act, 1967-68, CAN. REv. STAT. B-11, § 3.
145 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).

PROGRAM REGULATION

enumerated in section 3." Note that section 15 says shall regulate-it
gives the CRTC no choice. Likewise, section 3 states that the listed
objectives "can best be achieved by providing for. . regulation." The
two major themes that run through most of section 3 are the protection
and development of Canadian culture and the diversification of
programming.
The former strain is recognized in section 3(b), (f) and (g)(iv). Section 3(b) is the basic Canadian content section: "The Canadian broadcasting system should be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians
so as to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social
and economic fabric of Canada." The wording is very similar to that in
Red Lion: "political, social, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences." 1" It reflects how well the gist of Red Lion's right to diverse
programming is applicable to Canadian content as well as other program
regulation. Section 3(f) and 3(g)(iv) outline the statutory committment
of the CBC to "service that is predominantly Canadian in content and
character" 4 7 and to the "development of national unity and provision
for a continuing expression of Canadian identity."14' 8 Considering the
fact that the purpose of the CRTC's existence is to implement section 3
through regulation14 9 it is inconceivable that the CRTC could deregulate
Canadian content as the FCC did, by the issuance of a policy statement.
In Canada, the Act would have to be amended.
Another strain of section 3 is to provide for diversity in programming. As outlined at the beginning of part III of this paper, Canada is
seen as a mosaic with many independent parts, often separated by vast
geographic areas. It is for this reason that the Act is so committed to the
goal of diversity. Already one can predict that Red Lion fits in well with
the Canadian concept of broadcasting.
Sections 3(a), (c), (d), (e), (g)(i) and (iii), (h) and (i) all relate to
diversity. Section 3(a) declares that the airwaves are publicly owned.
This is a necessary presumption in Red Lion. Section 3(c) recognizes
both constitutional strains of the first amendment. 15 0 Section 3(c) states:
"The right to freedom of expression and the right of persons to receive
programs, subject only to generally applicable statutes and regulations, is
unquestioned." This fits perfectly with Red Lion. Furthermore, it is
likely that limits on these rights will be overturned on a Charter of
Rights attack, since section 1 of the Charter says that the rights therein
are "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." To allow any
statute or regulation to abrogate the freedom of expression in section 2(b)
146 Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S. at 390.
147 Broadcasting Act, 1967-68, CAN. REV. STAT. B-11, § 3(f).
148 Id. § 3(g)(iv).

149 Id. § 15.
150 At the time of drafting this Act the Canadian Bill of Rights was in force for federal

legislation.
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is certainly unconstitutional. Section 2(b) can only be limited by section
1 of the Charter.
Section 3(d) expressly requires diversity in programming: "The programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should be varied and comprehensive and should provide reasonable, balanced
opportunity for the expression of differing views on matters of public
concern and the programming provided should be of a high standard
. . . ." This section not only recognizes diversity as a goal but in the
same section recognizes a statutory fairness doctrine. This again fits Red
Lion perfectly. However, the Canadian statute goes even further, requiring programs to be of a "high standard."' 5 1 The regulation of quality is
an indication of the higly regulated nature of the Canadian system.
Quality control regulation may, however, be subject to a constitutional
challenge under the Charter. The success of such a challenge is not as
clear as it is under section 3(c) since Canada has a more limited view of
free press,
as compared to freedom of expression, than does the United
States.' 52
Section 3(e) states that "all Canadians are entitled to broadcast service in English and French." This recognizes the unique bilingual nature
of Canada and does not, of course, relate to the United States situation.
Section 3(g)(i) requires the CBC to provide "[a] balanced service of
information, enlightenment and entertainment of people of different ages,
interests and tastes covering the whole range of programming in fair proportion." Like Red Lion, but unlike WNCN, this section does not limit
the goal of diversity to public issues or nonentertainment, but expressly
authorizes wide diversity in entertainment and again goes even further by
requiring that this service be in "fair proportion."
Section 3(g)(iii) recognizes French and English cultural tensions and
the regional divisions in Canada. It specifically requires the CBC to try
to lessen these divisions through the broadcasting of "cultural and regional information and entertainment." Note the last two sections'5 3 relate only to the CBC and not to private broadcasters. Thus the Red Lion
rationale does not directly apply. However, Red Lion talks of public
broadcasting as a direct route to achieve the "ends and purposes" of the
first amendment, and would require such a public system to strive for
diversity and implicitly do so with more stringent standards. 4 Red
Lion recognizes, however, the fact that the U.S. government chose not to
go this route and so private broadcasters should have some constitutional
requirement
to provide diversified programming which is imposed by the
FCC. 55 Thus, Red Lion is indeed consistent with public regulation in
151 Broadcasting Act, 1967-68, CAN. REV. STAT. B-11, § 3(d).
152

See infra Part III(B).

153 Broadcasting Act, 1967-68, CAN. REv. STAT. B-11, § 3(g) (i),(ii).
154 395 U.S. at 390.

155 Id.at 390-91.
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Canada. So close is the reasoning that Justice White, the author of Red
Lion, may well have had the Canadian legislation in mind at the time.
Section 3(h) is also closely connected with the Red Lion decision.
This section provides: "Where any conflict arises between the objectives
of the national broadcasting service and the interests of the private element.., it shall be resolved in the public interest but paramount consideration shall be given to the objectives of the national broadcasting
service." Here the "public interest" is to be favored when resolving the
conflicts between private and public interests. This is more flexible than
the command in Red Lion that the rights of viewers and listeners must be
paramount to the rights of broadcasters.' 5 6 It is likely that the main aspect of the public interest to be served here is diversity since the CBC's
objectives, which heavily stress diversity and Canadian content, are to be
given paramount consideration. This flexible approach is what Chief
Judge Bazelon suggested in WEFM.157 He recognized the danger of automatically ruling in favor of program regulation and stressed a route
that would ensure maximum first amendment values without treading
too heavily on the rights of private broadcasters. This is what the Act
seems to attempt here.
Overall, the Act is almost an embodiment of Red Lion because it
attempts to encourage diversity for the particular needs of Canada, one
of those needs being to "safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural,
political, social and economic fabric of Canada." 158 While in some cases
the Act even goes beyond Red Lion, at no time could the CRTC sanction
or promote a case like WNCN as did the FCC and the U.S. Supreme
Court. It would go against the very essence of the Act to deregulate
entertainment programming.
b.

Cases

Section 28 of the Broadcasting Act provides a statutory fairness doctrine for purposes of elections. In Re CFRB and A. G. for Canada,'5 9 this
section of the Act was challenged as being ultra vires the Parliament of
Canada on division of powers grounds since the section governed provincial as well as federal elections. The court found that the pith and substance of the section was to prevent the use of radio for partisan
comment when there was insufficient time before an election for a person
or party attacked in a radio broadcast to answer."6 The view that the
section was intended as radio regulation and only had incidental, ifTany,
effects on provincial elections was sustained by the court.
Id at 390.
506 F.2d at 249.
158 Broadcasting Act, 1967-68,
159 1 Ont. 79 (H. Ct. 3. 1973).
160 Id at 82.
156

157

CAN. REv. STAT.

B-11 § 3(b).
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In CKOY Ltd. v. The Queen,16 ' a CRTC regulation requiring broadcasters to get consent before broadcasting any telephone interview was
upheld as an attempt to further section 3(d) of the Act, i.e., "high standards."' 6 2 The court said programming is: "more than the mere words
that go out over the air, but the total process of gathering, assembling
and putting out the programmes generally .. .""I Here the Canadian
Supreme Court could have used section 16(l)(b)(ix) which allows regulation in furtherance of section 3 where necessary, but instead chose to use
section 16(l)(b)(i), which relates to section 3(d), in order to insure that
the CRTC has wide powers to regulate content.' 64 The court also declared that the CRTC has "wide latitude with respect to the making of
regulations to implement policies and objects for which the Commission
was created.' 16 All in all, the Supreme Court has given the CRTC
sweeping power to regulate program content.
In CTV Television Network Ltd. v. CRTC,166 the Supreme Court
upheld a Canadian content requirement which required that a minimum
amount of original drama be produced by a licensee each year. This case
is relevant as a reaffirmation of CKOY and the wide powers of the
CRTC, as well as an explicit extention of this generous attitude toward
licencing as well as regulation.
Unfortunately, no cases exist in Canada which are equivalent to the
D.C. Circuit cases in which the regulatory agency declined to act. 167
This is primarily due to the construction of the Act-which states the
purpose of the Commission is to "regulate" through section 3-and the
attitudes of the CRTC towards regulation. However, for these same reasons it is likely that NBC v. United States, RCA and the D.C. Circuit
cases, which require some inquiry into whether the public interest is being served by the licensee, would find ready acceptance in the Canadian
courts. Section 3(h) is particularly on point since it requiresthe Commission to decide in favor of the "public interest" whenever the interests of
private broadcasters conflict with the objectives of diversity of the national broadcast service which are found in section 3(g).
B.

CanadianFreedom of Expression and Broadcasting

In attempting to apply U.S. constitutional doctrines in Canada one
must compare the constitutional structures and traditions of the two
countries. The United States system is a system of checks and balances
with one branch of government limiting the other, with the Constitution
as the binding thread and the Bill of Rights as the general limitation on
161 90 D.L.R.3d 1 (1978).
162 Id. at 10.
163 Id

164
165
166
167

Id
Id at 6.
41 N.R. 277, 285 (1982).
See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
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governmental interference. In Canada, the principle of parliamentary
supremacy provides, or at least provided, for provincial legislatures and
the federal parliament each to be supreme within their respective spheres,
without any checks and balances except as to the boundaries of those
spheres. There were some limits to this principle based on the preamble
of the British National Act, now the Constitution Act, 1867, which states
that Canada shall have "a Constitution similar in principle to that of the
United Kingdom."
However, in 1981 the Constitution Act, 1982 was made part of the
Constitution of Canada. Contained within that Act was The Charter of
Rights and Freedoms that entrenched a number of rights which, according to section 52 thereof, "is the supreme law of Canada, and any law
that is inconsistent. . . is of no force or effect." Expect for the limits of
the notwithstanding clause, 168 and the reasonable limits clause, 1 69 the
Charter has been made supreme over the will of Parliament and the provincial legislatures. It may be said, therefore, that a system of checks and
balances has at least been partially imposed on Canada. However, one
must realize that the constitutional traditions of old still remain and the
conservative traditions of the Canadian courts may yet limit the effect of
the Charter.
As yet, Canada still awaits the decisions of the Supreme Court to
settle such issues, so any discussion of the Charter now is merely educated speculation. However, because of the textual similarities in some
instances and the highly developed case law, U.S. constitutional principles will have at least some bearing on this development. The law of the
United States has often been referred to in appellate Charter cases. The
degree of applicability will probably vary from section to section of the
Charter depending on:
1. textual similarity or dissimilarity;
2. prior Canadian constitutional law (if any);
3. post-Charter Canadian case law (if any);
4. nature, compatability, and value of American case law; and,
5. nature of Canadian interests in the area (law and policy). 170
If it were not for a change in the drafting of section 1 of the Charter,
American cases would have no relevance whatsoever. Originally section
1 read: "subject only to such reasonable limits as are generally accepted
in a free and democratic society with a parliamentary system of government." Since then, the reference to parliamentary government has been
dropped, thus allowing American law to have some relevance.
1. Constitutional Text
In both Constitutions there is a freedom of speech or expression and
168 CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 33.

169 Id. § 1.
170 See supra Part HI(A).
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a freedom of the press. 17 1 In the United States it has been recognized' 72
that these two freedoms can be in conflict with one another; that is, if the
press is to operate freely are they then free to restrict the freedom of
others to speak? If not, where is the line drawn? With respect to broadcasting, Red Lion recognized that the rights of the broadcaster, the free
press, may conflict with the rights of viewers and listeners to receive
ideas and experiences, their freedom of speech. 173 As such, since the latter more directly served the purposes of the first amendment, that being
the protection of the "marketplace of ideas," the rights of the public
should be paramount. Is the same conflict possible in section 2(b) of the
Charter? If so, will the line be drawn in the same way?
The Charter says in section 2 that "[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms: b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication
....
At first glance this seems wider than the first amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, but considering the way the U.S. Constitution has
been interpreted it is not. However, it certainly is not more narrow. In
the United States "free speech" has been widely interpreted to encompass
many forms of "expression" including the right to receive ideas and experiences." "Free press" has also been widely interpreted as being applicable to many different media, although limited by NBC175v. United
States with respect to broadcasting so as to allow regulation.
In Canada does the text of section 2(b), "freedom of expression,"
recognize a right to receive "ideas and experiences"? Will it be so interpreted? The beginning of section 2 says that "everyone has" these rights.
That would seem, prima facie, to include the public as well as individuals. As well, the right here is more than a right to expression, but also a
right to free "thought, belief, opinion and expression."' 7 6 These elements
would together consititute a wide conception of "ideas" and could thus
be seen as a constitutional codification of the rationale of the first amendment of fostering a "marketplace of ideas." This would fit well with the
reasoning of Red Lion which provided alternate means to achieve the
ends and 177purpose of the first amendment through government
regulation.
Moreover, since a right to form and express ideas may be read as a
right in itself, the means to achieve it are open. Alternatively, if these
rights are not a constitutional codification of the market place of ideas,
then the rights of free "thought, belief and opinions" would be denied if
there was no opportunity to receive diverse ideas and experiences, since
."

171 Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. I with CANADiAN CONST. § 2(b).
172 See Red Lion Broadcasting,395 U.S. at 382; WEFM, 506 F.2d at 249.
173 395 U.S. at 380.
174 Id at 381.

175 NationalBroadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 217.
176 CHARTER Op RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 2.
177 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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these are the basis on which thoughts, beliefs and opinions are formed.
One can therefore infer a right to receive diverse ideas and experiences.
This speculation will be of no effect if the courts are not predisposed
to such arguments. However, as will be further discussed later, Ontario
Film and Video Appreciation Society v. OntarioBoard of Censors upheld
the right of the listener and viewer to receive communication as part of
section 2(b). 178 This right will probably be extended to broadcasting as
well since it was recognized even before Red Lion in section 3(c) of the
Broadcasting Act.
The text of section 2(b) raises two issues: 1) the effects of conflict
between press and expression; and 2) the degree of protection afforded
broadcasting as a "media of communication." Unlike the first amendment where there is a freedom of speech and a freedom of the press, in
Canada there is a freedom of expression including the freedom of the
press.17 9 Does this mean that in Canada "freedom of the press and other
media of communication" are part of the other four basic rights and not,
as in the United States, two related but separate freedoms? It seems that
these latter freedoms were included as an afterthought to ensure that
they would not be excluded if only the four basic rights were included.
This says something of Canada's attitude to a free press (and maybe
something about Pierre Trudeau's attitudes toward the press). The logical effect of this wording would be that in a conflict between one of the
four basic rights and the freedom of the press, the latter would not be
overly emphasized so as to exclude the former. Thus, one could infer a
preeminence of Red Lion's right to receive over the freedom of the press
in the text of the Charter.
This may be going a bit too far simply on one word, but one cannot
presume an accidental or haphazard wording. One must also consider
the great weight given to wording in statutory and constitutional interpretation in Canada. Since legislative or constitutional history is not
considered in Canadian courts, courts rely largely on what is within the
four corners of the statute. Alternatively, the freedom of the press would
not be on an equal level with the other four freedoms but would be only
one factor. As will be later discussed, this limited view of freedom of the
press tends to appear in cases.18 0
Did the drafters of the Charter intend to put "other media of communication" on the same constitutional level, with the same constitutional protection, as the freedom of the press? It can be argued that by
expressly including this freedom in the Charter, while it is not express in
the U.S. Constitution, this is what the Charter drafters intended. How178 147 D.L.R.3d 58 (Ont. H. Ct. J. 1983). "[Freedom of expression] also extends to the listener and to the viewer, whose freedom to receive communication is included in the guaranteed
right." Id, afl'd, 45 Ont. 2d 20 (Fed. CL App. 1984), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canadagranted April 4, 1984.
179 CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 2(b).

180 Southam Inc. v. The Queen (No. 1), 146 D.L.R.3d 408 (Ont. H. Ct. J. 1983).
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ever, this would not be likely considering: 1) the probable interpretation
of the word "including" to mean that free press and free broadcasters are
to be treated as lesser aspects of the larger four rights and thus should be
balanced with competing rights in specific circumstances; 2) the Broadcasting Act which by implication requires such comprehensive regulation
of broadcasters and in section 3(c) expressly limits the freedom of broadcasters; 3) the CFRB case' held that each media is to be treated differently for the purpose of free speech;18 2 and, 4) one cannot presume the
equality in scope of any rights to any exact degree because section 1 of
the Charter imposes limits as to the facts of each case.1 1 3 It is likely then
that the scope of the freedom of broadcasters will be determined on a
case by case basis, not on the basis of the text alone.
2.
a.

Pre-Charter Cases

Freedom of Expression

Before the Bill of Rights, there was some basis for the freedom of
expression in the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provided
for "a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom."
In a concurring judgment in Switzman v. Elbing and the Attorney General of Quebec, Abbott J. said that "free expression" and "discussion
. . . are essential to the workings of a parliamentary democracy."184
Although he recognized that there were limits to this right, he said in
obiter that neither Parliament nor the Legislatures of the provinces can
abrogate that right.
This right fared worse under the Bill of Rights. Although it was
upheld in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia,
the Supreme Court of Canada used a division of powers argument to
impugned legislation in Re Nova Scotia Board of Censors and
uphold the
85
McNeiL 1
In CTV Television Network Ltd. v. Canadian Radio-Television &
Telecommunications Comm'n'8 6 the Supreme Court merely asserted that
the freedom of expression was not abridged by minimum Canadian content drama requirements imposed on a licensee. Chief Justice Laskin
widest,
said that even section 3(c) of the Broadcasting Act, if taken at its
8 7
would not support striking down such content requirements.1 However, he ignored the Bill of Rights and Switzman. Although both of these
are limited, they are certainly less limited than section 3(c) of the Act
181 CFRB and the Attorney General of Canada (No. 2), 30 D.L.R.3d 279 (Ont. H. CL J.
1973).
182 Note that many Canadian cases are loose with the use of the words "speech" or "press!'
and should be analyzed according to the context.
183 See Ontario Bd of Censors, 147 D.L.1.3d at 56.
184 7 D.L.R.2d 337 (1957).
185 84 D.L.R.3d 1 (1978).
186 134 D.L.R.3d 193 (1982).
187 Id

at 200.
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and Justice Laskin should have considered them. The Canadian courts
have not been wonderfully generous with respect to the freedom of expression before the Charter, despite what the Ontario Court of Appeals
said in Ontario Board of Censors. If not for a change of heart by the
courts after the Charter, comparison to U.S. cases would have been a
waste of time.
b.

Freedom of the Press and Broadcaster

The pre-Charter trend in freedom of expression has been parallel to
the freedom of the press. However, its post-Charter success has not been
as bright as the freedom of expression. This tendency is hinted at in the
pre-Charter cases. In Saumur v. City of Quebec,l"' Justice Rand, citing
the 1938 Supreme Court decision of Re Alberta Legislation,"19 in which
Justice Cannon recognized a "right of public debate," said that "freedom
of discussion is essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic
state; it cannot be curtailed without affecting the right of the people to be
informed through sources independent of government."'" The basis for
this right was the preamble to the British National Act. Keep in mind
that the rationale for this right was the "right of the public to be informed." This is important as a precursor to the Red Lion type of thinking now predominant in the Broadcasting Act and in the OntarioBoard
of Censors case. It also shows that, unlike the United States, the emphasis on free press is not on the rights of the press but on the right of the
public.
The freedom of the press was treated similarly to the freedom of
expression under the Bill of Rights.1 9 In Hlookoof v. City of Vancouver, "9' 2 a license for certain premises was revoked because of defamatory
remarks made in a93newspaper. The revocation was upheld on division of
powers grounds.1
In Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, 19 the freedom
of the press was not directly applied but was relevant and was referred to
in dicta. In that case the majority interpreted the British Columbia
Human Rights Code which required that services be offered in a nondiscriminatory way.' 9 5 Justice Martland here said that the newspaper defendant must print a homosexual classified ad because classified
advertising by newspapers was a service "customarily available to the
public."' 96 In dicta, however, he said that had the refusal to print been
188
189
190
191
192

[1953] 4 D.L.R. 641, 672.
[1938] 2 D.L.R. 81.
[1953] 4 D.L.R. at 641.
See Re Nova Scotia Bd. of Censors and McNeil, 84 D.L.R.3d 1 (1978).
67 D.L.R.2d 119 (B.C. S. Ct. 1968).

193 Id.

194 97 D.L.R.3d 577 (1974).
195 B.C. REv. STAT. ch. 186.
196 97 D.L.R.3d at 591.
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related to editorial content, i.e., a letter to the editor, the newspaper
would not have had to print it because of the freedom of the press in the
Bill of Rights.19 7
Does this mean that the freedom of the press is limited to content or
is this merely the traditional reluctance to render a statute inoperative
because of the Bill of Rights? If it is the former, it continues the tradition
of a limited free press in Canada. If it is the latter, then we can expect
this to change because the Charter of Rights is now entrenched. The
post-Charter cases will determine which is the case.
In CFRB the Ontario High Court spoke of "freedom of expression," 19 but in fact what they addressed was freedom of the broadcaster,
like the press, to be unregulated. It was claimed here that the regulation
of newspapers over election comment is not acceptable and therefore
should not be allowed with respect to broadcasters either. The court responded to this, stating that broadcasters are to be treated differently
from newspapers. 199 Some reference was made to the limits in section
3(c) of the Act. E° Since this regulation would have been theoretically
inoperative if imposed on the press, but was still held to be valid with
respect to broadcasting, an implication arises that different standards exist for different "media of communication."
In CKOY the Supreme Court of Canada questioned whether broadcasting comes under the word "press" in the Bill of Rights, 0 1 but did
not answer the question.20 2 It is probable Justice Spence said that "the
freedom of the press is not absolute and. . . is subject to the ordinary
law," and so upheld the statutory limits in section 3(c) of the Act,2 °3
because of the limits of the Bill of Rights as a statutory instrument for
interpretation. However, he had no such excuse for his comment that
there is no infringement of rights because nobody is hindered from making comments. 2 4 Here he was recognizing that the freedom of expression of the speaker is not infringed, but he either ignored or rejected the
freedoms of the broadcaster. In fact, he expressly recognized that he was
protecting the freedom of the person interviewed to withhold his
205
speech.
The freedom of the press may or may not be more limited than the
freedom of expression, depending on how it fares after the Charter.
However, the freedom of the broadcaster is severely limited in Canada
197 97 D.L.R.3d at 589, citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Turnillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
198 30 D.L.R.3d at 283.
199 Id.
200
M at 281.
201 90 D.L.R.3d at 12.
202 This was probably the reason for the wording "and other media of communication" in the

Charter.
203 90 D.L.RL3d at 12.
204
205

Id.
Id
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6
° especially when other free speech
2 20
°8 and CKOY,
according
CFRB
rights are to
at stake.

3.

Post-Charter Cases

In evaluating the effect of U.S. law on the interpretation of the Canadian Constitution how should one compare pre- and post-Charter
cases? Post-Charter cases are of course more attuned to the present constitutional realities-the Charter. They are also generally more up to
date. 2°9 However, there are no section 2(b) post-Charter Supreme Court
cases or any section 2(b) broadcasting cases yet.210 As well, the old cases
are still relevant because the Bill of Rights and the Constitution Act,
1867 are still relevant. They should, therefore, be treated merely as cases
of relatively equal value, that is, equal to pre-Charter cases and possibly
continuing in the development of the case law for the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press.
a. Freedom of Expression: The Rights of Viewers and Listeners
The only case to have dealt with the freedom of expression, as opposed to freedom of the press, is Ontario Film and Video Appreciation
Society v. OntarioBoard of Censors.2 " In that case two movies, "Not a
Love Story" and "America" were censored by the Ontario Board. The
authority of the board to do so was challenged on the basis of section 2(b)
of the Charter, as a "prior restraint" of free expression. 2 12 This claim
was based on the American doctrine which proclaims that if there is
prior restraint there must also be procedural safeguards, including a definition of obscenity, notice administrative procedures and prompt judicial
review.21 3 In this case, it was alleged that the lack of legal criteria or
regulations allowed unfettered discretionary application. The court
stated that section 2(b) is "mainly declaratory of the freedoms which
have long existed in Canada. . .for we Canadians have always enjoyed
a full measure of freedom of expression, as well as the other
206 30 D.L.R.3d at 279.
207 90 D.L.R.3d at 2.
208 Id

But see CT.V, 134 D.L.R.3d at 193.
210 Since the writing of this paper the Federal Court of Appeal has decided New Brunswick
Broadcasting v. CRTC, 55 N.R. 143 (1984). In this case denial of a licence was upheld despite a
section 2(b) challenge by the broadcaster. The court refrained from deciding the case on the basis of
the Charter. The court instead treated licensing of the airwaves as a right to access to public property. Accordingly section 2(b) did not provide a remedy with respect to access to this property for
broadcasters or the public. This property is to be regulated by the CRTC. However, only right to a
licence was denied. Program regulation was not in issue. Program regulation clearly raises freedom
of expression, opinion, etc., whereas denial of a licence may not.
211 147 D.L.R.3d at 59.
209

212 Id. at 60-61.
213 Id

at 63.
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freedoms."2' 14
This of course, is overstating the extent of protection that has been
available in Canada, but as the court pointed out the Charter now "guarantees these rights . . . and . . . permit[s] expansion over the years
ahead."2'15 Does this statement apply to freedom of the press in the same
degree? Although freedom of the press is included in the quote from
section 2(b), it is not entirely clear that "other freedoms" refers to freedom of the press and other media. Even assuming that "other freedoms"
refers to press and other media, why didn't the court say "as well as the
press"?2 16 One would generally expect an appellate court interpreting a
new constitution to be less ambiguous. One cannot take this statement to
apply fully, if at all, to freedom of the press, and must instead rely directly on freedom of the press cases for that purpose.2 17
The rest of the case interpreted the limit of the right by section 1 of
the Charter, stating: "The [Charter]. . .guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonablelimits prescribedby law
as can be demonstrablyjustified in a free and democratic society."2'18
Since the rights have been prima facie abridged here the Act cannot
be constitutional as applied unless section 1 applies, since the rights are
guaranted subject only to section 1. As well, the court recognized that
the onus of proving section 1 is on the government. The court agreed
that on the basis of comparative analysis the limits of censorship are "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. ' 219 The court denied the government's argument that this was merely regulation of
commercial activity. Instead, the Court recognized the rights of the theater owner
"to express someone else's ideas or show someone else's
220
f flm

This right to express ideas of others does not necessarily extend into
broadcasting because of the scarcity argument.221 The court also recognized the rights of the "listenerand viewer, whosefreedom to receive communication is included in the guaranteed right. ' 222 This is almost
verbatim from Red Lion2 23 and is the best illustration so far that Red
Lion has found fertile ground in Canada.
The court also noted that it is constitutionally acceptable to have
different limits for different modes of expression as long as section 1 is
214 Id at 64.

215 Idj
216 Id

217
218
219
220
221

See.ag., Southam, 146 D.L.R.3d 408.
Id at 413 (emphasis added).
147 D.L.R.3d at 65.
Ideat 66.
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 382; NationalBroadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at

218.
222 147 D.L.R.3d at 66 (emphasis added).
23 395 U.S. at 385.

PROGRAM REGULATION

met. 2 This alters CFRB slightly. It seems to say that all forms of expression are equally protected 22- but that different levels of limitation by
section 1 are possible. This is a reasonable construction of the Charter's
structure since section 1 is meant to be flexible. Thus, as mentioned earlier, although section 3(c) limits are "prescribed by law," they are probably not "reasonable limits" nor "demonstrably justified." However, the
logical and reasonable limits of Red Lion and NBC would still remain
and would likely be acceptable under section 1.
Yet, the court withheld judgment as to whether the limits were reasonable since they were not "prescribed by law" and thus failed on that
ground. The court said that "law" meant statutes, regulations, or common law. 226 Here the only limits were discretionary not legal.

b. Freedom of Press and other Media of Communication
In Southam Ina v. the Queen the issue is "not.

.

.freedom of the

pressper se" but access of a journalist to a juvenile delinquent hearing as
a member of the general public. 7 The Act called for a complete ban of
the public from such hearings. The court overturned this, saying that a
complete ban is not justified as a "reasonable limit" per section 1;228 but
what right was infringed? The court said that openness of the courts is
"one of the hallmarks of a democratic society.

' 229

In order to provide

accountability of the courts and to promote openness of ideas and information generally, the court ruled that reasonable physical access to the
courts was a constitutional right based on a "large and liberal construction" of section 2(b).230
It is indeed significant that the court in Southam discusses the textual argument per freedom of the press. Although, the court said that
"limited" was not the appropriate word to use for the effect of the word
"including" in section 2(b), the court also said that "freedom of expression would seem to have a wider and larger connotation than the words
'freedom of the press.' "231 It decided this on the basis of the different
wording of section
2(b) and the first amendment ("and" compared to
232
"including").

Despite the result in Southam and the fact that a journalist was involved, this case should not be taken to mean that freedom of the press is
strong. As the court said, "it is not a freedom of the press case. "233 It
224
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said that freedom of the press is weaker than freedom of expression.
There were also no other rights at stake here since only physical access
was required.
This last point is particularly significant when comparing Southam
to true free press cases involving gag orders, Regina v. Begley23 4 and Regina v. Banville.23 In Banville, the least restrictive way was held to be a
ban. Banville, when compared to Southam, shows the true limits of the
freedom of the press compared to the freedom of expression. It also
of freedom of the press compared to other constitushows that weakness
2 36
tional rights.
4. Application of American Constitutional Law in Canada
As the last section has established, the freedom of expression in
Canada seems to be thriving, 237 whereas the freedom of the press, including the freedom of broadcasters, 2 38 is weak.239 According to the Ontario
Board of Censors case,24 all forms of expression are equally protected in
theory, but section 1 can vary that actual protection for each form.
Southam however, recognizes that freedom of the press is not a form of
expression but a lesser right to freedom of the "medium" along which the
important forms of expression are "disseminated." 2 4 1
The presence of listener's and viewer's rights and their predominance over the freedom of broadcasters as expressed in Red Lion seem to
be almost a foregone conclusion. I say almost because we have yet to
hear from the Supreme Court of Canada. However, it is quite unlikely
that the Supreme Court of Canada will submerge the freedom of viewers
and listeners to receive below the preference for the freedom of broadcasters, as seems to have been the trend in the United States. The hesitant balancing approach of Bazelon in WEFM would likely be the
minimal level to which the rights of viewers and listeners will be protected in Canada.
In considering what directions the Supreme Court might go on the
issue, one should consider the character of the Court and its recent
trends and ideological stances compared to those in the United States. In
the United States, the Warren Court (the Court at the time of Red Lion)
did not limit itself to traditional, conservative views of rights as mini2 Can. Rts. Rep. 50 (Ont. H. Ct. J. 1982).
141 D.LR.3d 36 (N.B. Prov. Ct. 1983), affid, 145 D.L.R.3d 595 (N.B.Q.B. 1983).
Contrast with U.S. cases dealing with freedom of the press: Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976); Richard Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 535 (1980); Chandler v. Florida,
449 U.S. 560 (1981); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
237 Ontario Bd. of Censors, 170 D.L.R.3d at 65; Southam, 146 D.L.R.3d at 408.
238 CKOY, 90 D.L.R.3d at 10; CFRB, 30 D.L.R.3d at 279.
239 Hlookoof, 67 D.L.R.2d at 121; Southam, 146 D.L.R.3d at 410; Bagley, 2 Can. Rts. Rep. at
53; Banville, 141 D.L.R.3d at 40.
240 170 D.L.R.3d at 65.
241 146 D.L.R.3d at 416.
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mum guarantees for individuals versus the government, while the Burger
Court has been so limited.2 42 In Canada, the Supreme Court tends to be
closer to the Burger Court on some issues but not uniformly so. Chief
Justice Laskin is a good example. In some cases he was very conserva-

tive with respect to rights and freedoms,243 while other times he was very

liberal. 2" If there is any tendency of the court other than on an area by
area basis, it is to be deferential to the federal government.2 4 5 Since the
CRTC is not about to deregulate programming, it is unlikely that any
challenge to deregulate would succeed. However, if the CRTC initiated
deregulation with Parliamentary support, that may be another story.

As to particular United States Supreme Court cases, the alternatives
to Red Lion are certainly not attractive to the Canadian courts or to the
Canadian system. CBS would not likely be followed because of the Gay
Alliance case which refused to apply the Bill of Rights but relied on common law. The courts in Canada might not be as hesitant to restrict
broadcasters as in CBS, whether seen as a service or content because of
the limits on broadcaster rights inherent in the Act which has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the past despite freedom of the press
challenges.
Canada would also not likely follow WNCN because of the aversion
Canada feels toward deregulation, the nature of the Act and the still
strong recognition of wide constitutional Red Lion principles. As well, a
procedural fairness doctrine accepted in Re Nicholson & Holdmand Norfolk Board of Commissioners of the Police2 ' would likely require
hearings in at least some circumstances. However, just because Canada
decidedly leans in the direction of Red Lion and decidedly leans against
its American alternatives does not mean that the Supreme Court of Canada will necessarily follow Red Lion. In fact, the Supreme Court has a
tendency not to follow but to take suggestions from the United States.
However, the Canadian tendencies and doctrines outlined in this paper
show at least the probable bounds of the Supreme Court's eventual decision on the topic.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The discussion of the doctorinal value of the statutory decisions and
the tendencies of Canadian policy, as well as the Canadian statutory context, make it evident that the CRTC could not and should not deregulate
as did the FCC. At the very least, legislative amendment would be
needed. The way the system is formulated, any major deregulation effort
242 Compare Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) with
Hudgers v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
243 Fg., CTV, 41 N.R. at 285.
244 Eg., R. v. Burnshire, 44 D.L.R.3d 584, 584-85 (1976).
245 Eg., CT V, 41 N.R. at 285; CKOY, 90 D.L.R.3d at 10.
246 88 D.L.R.3d 671 (1979).
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would totally disrupt the entire Canadian broadcast system. However, in
the United States, where broadcasters have always had great discretion in
programming, deregulation was not much of a radical change. Even if
Canada did revise the entire broadcasting scheme, it is likely that at least
some provision for hearings would be required when the market breaks
down and the interests of diversity are not served. It is here that the
constitution combines with policy in both the United States and Canada,
thereby requiring diversity for the minority interests. The social structure of Canada and its cultural identity crisis particularly demand it in
Canada. Indeed, the nature of Canada and its relation to the United
States may require hearings, not only to determine if there is sufficient
diversity but also whether there is sufficient Canadian content.
Constitutionally, the Red Lion doctrine requires the government to
ensure that "listeners and viewers" have adequate exposure to "political,
social, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences." '2 47 Neither
Congress nor the FCC can deny this right. Yet, the FCC seems to have
done so with the support of the Supreme Court, claiming that the market
will suffice for this purpose. The Burger Court has misconstrued the nature of the government's duty. Canada understands this duty and is willing to enforce it. It is entrenched in the Act and the case law. As a
result of the social problems in Canada, the duty is even greater. This is
why Canada has Canadian content-to provide adequate exposure to social ideas and experiences.2 48 The sooner the United States recognizes
the nature of Canada's stance and realizes that their own legal doctrines
support it, the sooner conflict between the two nations in communications issues like piracy, satellites and radio advertising taxation will be
resolved.
247
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